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Fiscal policy under new Labour∗ 
Malcolm Sawyer 
1. Introduction 
The Labour government elected in May 1997 came into office stressing that it was ‘new 
Labour’ and pursuing a ‘third way’ in economic policy.1 In macroeconomic terms, the 
emphasis was on the avoidance of ‘tax and spend’ policies, restraints on public expenditure 
notably in the first two years of office and the adoption of the so-called ‘golden rule’ of 
public finances under which the current budget of government would be in balance over the 
course of a business cycle.2 There was something akin to a disavowal of a Keynesian 
approach to macroeconomic policies and specifically the active use of fiscal policy to manage 
demand, though an emphasis on the operation of fiscal policy as an automatic stabiliser. The 
reduction of unemployment was to be addressed through labour market reforms and 
flexibility, which would, in effect, lower the ‘non-accelerating rate of unemployment’ and 
thereby lower unemployment.  
The paper seeks to provide an evaluation of fiscal policy under new Labour, with a critical 
review of the main planks of fiscal policy and a consideration of the relationship between that 
policy and the macroeconomic performance of the UK economy in the past decade. 
2. Recent macroeconomic performance 
Table 1 summarises some of the aspects of recent macroeconomic performance.  In growth 
terms, GDP has grown at an average annual rate of 2.8 per cent over the period 1997-2005.  
This can be compared with the previous eight years where growth averaged 1.9 per cent, 
though over the period 1992 to 1997 growth averaged 3.1 per cent. Comparisons with earlier 
periods in terms of the rate of growth depend crucially on whether the recession of 1990/1991 
is or is not included. Growth has been relatively stable, and specifically there were no periods 
of negative growth, whereas in the preceding quarter of a century there had been three 
recessions (1974/75, 1980/1, 1990/1), enabling the Chancellor to boost in December 2006 of 
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 This paper arises from joint work with Philip Arestis to whom I am grateful for comments 
on this paper as well as more general discussions. I am also grateful for the helpful comments 
from two anonymous referees. 
1
 See Arestis and Sawyer (2001a) for a view on the economics of the ‘third way’, and Arestis 
and Sawyer (2001b) for some assessments of ‘third way’ economic policies in a range of 
countries. 
2
 For example, from the 1997 manifesto (Labour Party, 1997), “Save to invest is our 
approach, not tax and spend”, and “We will enforce the ‘golden rule’ of public spending - 
over the economic cycle, we will only borrow to invest and not to fund current expenditure.” 
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the “longest unbroken expansion since quarterly records began, with GDP now having grown 
for 57 consecutive quarters” (Treasury, 2006c, p.1). Inflation has remained low and 
consistently met the Chancellor’s target of 2 per cent plus or minus 1 per cent (though 
touching the upper limit of 3 per cent in January 2007).3 Unemployment on the claimant 
count fell continuously from 1993 until 2004, reaching its lowest level of 2.6 per cent in 
February 2005 (the lowest since 1974) since when it has been rising to reach 3 per cent late  
2006 on the claimant count. On the ILO definition, unemployment is lower at the end of the 
period than at the beginning, though the decline is proportionately less than on the claimant 
count. Since 2000 this unemployment rate has been broadly flat though recently rising 
through much of 2006 to a figure of 5.5 per cent in late 2006.. The current account position 
has not been generally seen as a matter of concern, though the deficit has averaged (since 
1999) at slightly over 2 per cent of GDP. The relative decline of manufacturing industry has 
continued, and manufacturing output has been flat over the period since 1997. 
Table 1 near here 
Figures such as those in Table 1 are used to support the view that macroeconomic 
performance in the past decade or so has been rather good – in the phrase used by the 
governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, the ‘NICE’ decade – “Non-Inflationary 
Continuous Expansion” (King, 2003). The government and Chancellor, amongst others, have 
strongly promoted the idea that macroeconomic performance, in terms of the level (e.g. of 
inflation, growth) and variability (‘stability’), has been particularly good.. Recent 
endorsements have come from the OECD and IMF4. For example, in their report on the UK, 
the OECD write that: 
“Macroeconomic performance over the last decade has been a paragon of stability: GDP 
growth has remained closer to potential than for almost any other OECD country; the 
unemployment rate has fallen to its lowest level and has been the least volatile since the 
1970s; and inflation has remained stable and close to the official target. Perhaps most 
surprisingly, in the period since the current monetary and fiscal framework has been in place, 
not only has the effective exchange rate been more stable than at any time since the Bretton 
Woods period, but it is also among the most stable in the OECD and more stable than for the 
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 This refers to the current target set in terms of the HICP to which the figures in Table 1 
refer. For much of the time the target was set in terms of the RPI and used the figure of 2.5 
per cent.  
4
 See, for example, United Kingdom—2005 Article IV Consultation Concluding Statement of 
the IMF Mission http://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2005/121905.htm 
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major euro area countries.” This performance is ascribed “to the strength of the institutional 
arrangements for setting monetary and fiscal policy … as well as to the flexibility of labour 
and product markets” (OECD, 2005, p.24). However, “one area where macroeconomic policy 
does, however, require attention is fiscal policy” (OECD 2005, p. 34).  
How good has the record on unemployment been ? On the ILO measure (said to be the 
government’s preferred measure), unemployment remained at a higher level and declined less 
rapidly than on the claimant count. “However, while the unemployment rate has fallen to its 
lowest level in three decades and by nearly 7 percentage points from a peak in the mid-1980s, 
there has been little fall in the inactivity rate … Indeed, while the activity rate of women has 
risen substantially, the male inactivity rate has shown a consistent upward trend accompanied 
by a similar rise in men reporting long-term sickness or disability as the main reason for 
inactivity. In 1980 the number claiming disability-related benefits was less than the number 
claiming unemployment benefit, whereas currently the former are three and half times as 
great. While increasing numbers on disability-related benefits is common in many OECD 
countries, the United Kingdom stands out as having a relatively high concentration of 
disability among prime-age males” (OECD 2005, p.39).  “Seven per cent of the 25-54-year-
old men are now inactive outside the labour market, many more than three decades ago. Solid 
growth since the late 1990s has brought down unemployment but not inactivity, with 2½ 
million currently claiming incapacity benefit” (OECD 2005, p. 99). When regard is given to 
the inactivity rate (as mentioned above) the record on unemployment is not quite so good.  
3. The nature of new Labour’s fiscal policy 
In their draft manifesto of 1996 the Labour Party (1996) stated that “We will enforce the 
‘golden rule’ of public spending – over the economic cycle, we will only borrow to invest 
and not to fund current expenditure”. This did not differ substantially from the stated 
objectives the previous government which had stated that “The Government's fiscal objective 
is to bring the PSBR [public sector borrowing requirement] back toward balance over the 
medium term, and in particular to ensure that when the economy is on trend the public sector 
borrows no more than is required to finance its net capital spending.” (Treasury, 1995, p.18). 
“The role of fiscal policy is to ensure sound public finances. …. Aiming for budget balance is 
a prudent objective given the considerable uncertainties about medium term prospects” 
(Treasury, 1994, p.16)   
Early in its term of office, the Government brought in the Code for Fiscal Stability (Treasury 
1998) which indicates many of the key features of the approach of new Labour in the area of 
macroeconomic policy. In the view of the Treasury, “The Code sets out clearly the 
4 
Government’s commitment to a commonsense and honest approach to managing the public 
finances in the long-term interests of Britain. It is motivated by three key considerations:  
- a stable economic environment is vital if growth and employment are to prosper; 
- the conduct of fiscal policy is a critical influence on economic stability; and the framework 
for fiscal policy inherited by the Government had failed to deliver a stable economic 
environment. Indeed, fiscal policy had been an important source of instability in the 
economy. 
The Code for Fiscal Stability is designed to address past weaknesses in the fiscal policy 
framework. In particular, it strengthens the openness, transparency and accountability of 
fiscal policy, features that also characterise the framework for monetary policy following the 
introduction of the Bank of England Act 1998. It improves the quality of information given to 
the public, the lack of which in the past was an important factor underlying policy mistakes.” 
(Treasury, 1998, p. 2). 
The operation of fiscal policy has been subject throughout the period to the operation of:   
“the golden rule: over the economic cycle, the Government will borrow only to invest and not 
to fund current spending; and 
the sustainable investment rule: public sector net debt as a proportion of GDP will be held 
over the economic cycle at a stable and prudent level. Other things being equal, net debt will 
be maintained below 40 per cent of GDP over the economic cycle” (Treasury, 2006a, p.18). 
This refers to public sector net debt: the gross debt figure calculated according to the 
Maastricht Treaty rules is around 6  per cent of GDP higher.  
The appeal of the ‘golden rule’ appears to come from two aspects. First, it highlighted an 
apparent commitment to higher levels of public investment. “The previous fiscal policy 
regime concentrated on various targets, usually expressed in terms of what is now called the 
public sector net cash requirement. This regime made no formal distinction between capital 
and current spending. A significant shortcoming of this approach was that it created a bias 
against capital spending. Current and capital spending could be offset against each other, 
making capital projects – where returns appear only in the future – an easy target when it 
became necessary to tighten the overall fiscal policy stance. The bias against capital 
contributed to a considerable under-investment in public assets.” (Balls and O’Donnell, 2002, 
p.160) 5.  
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 This book carried a forward by the Chancellor and described on the Treasury web-site as a 
book of the Treasury, and at the time of writing Balls was Chief Economic Advisor to the 
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Public sector net investment had fallen dramatically in the preceding three decades, and the 
figures in Balls and O’Donnell (2002, p. 161) indicate from over 7 per cent of GDP in mid 
1960s to well below 1 per cent in late 1980s and again in the second half of the 1990s. How 
far the golden rule rectifies that situation may be questioned. It is well-known that an overall 
budget deficit to GDP ratio (d) would lead to debt to GDP ratio (b) stabilising at: b = d/g, 
where g  is the nominal growth rate. Hence for a nominal growth rate of around 5 per cent 
(real growth of 2.5 per cent, inflation of 2.5 per cent), a 40 per cent debt to GDP ratio would 
be consistent with a 2 per cent average budget deficit.  As the OECD remark “the share of 
government investment in GDP has risen, and there are plans for it to rise further. 
Nevertheless, even after it rises to just under 2½ per cent of GDP next year, it still remains 
relatively modest compared with many other OECD countries and may be inadequate to 
correct years of neglect.” (OECD, 2005, pp.14-15). Further, the use of the private finance 
initiative (PFI), further discussed below, in effect turns what would be capital expenditure by 
government into current expenditure : building a school under ‘conventional’ finance 
involves a capital cost in the present, followed by interest payments on the borrowing. Under 
PFI, the school would be financed by the private sector and then leased back to the 
government, and the leasing charges appear as current expenditure. 
Second, the ‘golden rule’ appeared to place clear limits on the size of the budget deficit, and 
to counter charges of profligacy and ‘tax and spend’.  It focuses on the role of fiscal policy as 
an automatic stabiliser “[F]iscal policy can help to stabilise the economy through the 
operation of the ‘automatic stabilisers’ … These movements [in the budget balance] will 
support monetary policy by dampening economic cycles without putting at risk the long-term 
sustainability of fiscal policy” (Balls and O’Donnell, 2002, p. 158). It is further argued that 
“the chosen fiscal rules must also allow for sensible discretionary adjustments to fiscal 
policy” and gives the example of fiscal tightening in the early years of the Labour 
government “to support monetary policy and restore the structural integrity of the public 
finances” (Balls and O’Donnell, 2002, p 158). It is noteworthy that fiscal policy appears in a 
subordinate role to monetary policy (see Arestis and Sawyer, 2004a, 2004b and 2006 for 
doubts on the effectiveness of monetary policy). Although discretionary adjustments are 
permissible, there is no role ascribed in, for example, Treasury (2000, 2006b) or Balls and 
O’Donnell (2002), for active fiscal policy directed towards demand management. 
                                                                                                                                                  
Treasury (subsequent elected member of Parliament and appointed Economic Secretary to the 
Treasury, and O’Donnell was head of the Government Economic Service (and subsequently 
Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service). 
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One of the main arguments put for the ‘golden rule’ concerned inter-generational ‘fairness’ 
‘The Government is committed to the principle of fairness, both between and within 
generations. When making fiscal and debt management policy decisions it is important that 
governments take into account the financial effects on future generations. It would be unfair 
to make future generations meet the cost of policies that primarily benefit the current 
generation. Similarly, the current generation should not be expected to pay unduly for 
policies that will only benefit future generations. Fairness within broad groups of the current 
generation is also important.’ (Balls and O’Donnell, 2002, p. 139) 
It is though recognized that the matching of costs and benefits cannot be exact. ‘It is not 
practical, of course, to match the timing of the streams of costs and benefits for each and 
every spending proposal. But, in aggregate, the Government takes the view that current 
spending, which mainly provides benefits to existing taxpayers. Similarly, because capital 
spending produces a stream of services over time, it is fair that this form of spending is 
financed initially through borrowing. This behaviour should ensure that, to the extent 
practicable, each generation pays for the benefits of the public services that it consumes.’ 
(Balls and O’Donnell, 2002, p.162). The distinction is made between present generation and 
future generations, but not between the generation in say 5 years hence and the generation in 
say 10 years hence. It is not readily apparent that it is more unfair for say group A* in 
generation 1 to pay for benefits which accrue to group A in generation 0 (where A and A* 
may substantially overlap in membership) than it is for group B in generation 0 to pay for the 
benefits accruing to group A.  
‘The key feature of this definition is that it equates capital spending with future benefits. The 
definition excludes some items of spending  which have some, but not all, the characteristics 
of investment. Although education gives rise to a stream of benefits over time, the capital 
value and its depreciation rate is not something which can be estimated easily or reliably’ 
(Balls and O’Donnell, 2002, p.167). The distinction between policies (and expenditure) 
which primarily benefit the current generation and policies (expenditure) which primarily 
benefit future generations does not correspond to the distinction between current expenditure 
and capital expenditure. The benefits from current expenditure on education accrue in the 
future. Investment in the application of the golden rule is limited to (net) fixed capital 
formation. The rhetoric of increased public investment has often been extended much more 
widely and applied to general expenditure on education and health (reflected in, for example 
the titles of Treasury, 2005, 2006a, 2006c). Indeed such expenditure may rightly be regarded 
as investment in the sense that they involve expenditure in the present which yields future 
7 
benefits. It is then far from clear as to why the costs of investment in physical capital should 
be spread over the future, but the costs of education and health not. Further, the resource 
costs of government expenditure however financed accrue in the present in so far as 
investment (or other forms of government expenditure) has the opportunity cost of reduced 
consumption. 
The PFI also have inter-generational consequences. The use of PFI rather than bond finance 
imposes greater costs on the future generations (of taxpayers) since the effective cost of 
finance is higher under PFI than under ‘conventional’ financing.   
In fiscal policy terms the impact of a budget deficit on the level of economic activity does not 
depend on the division of expenditure between current and capital budgets. Current and 
capital expenditure are essentially similar in that they involve expenditure in the present and 
are paid for by a combination of tax revenue and borrowing. Public capital expenditure, in 
general, does not generate future revenue streams in any direct sense since any output derived 
from that investment is not marketed. Public capital expenditure may, directly and indirectly 
through positive effects on private investment (cf. Aschauer, 1989 for example) raise future 
supply potential and thereby raise future tax revenues. But, as mentioned above, some current 
public expenditure (notably on education and health) is also likely to do so.  
The acceptable budget deficit (over the course of the business cycle) is determined under the 
‘golden rule’ by the scale of public net capital expenditure. The figures in table 4 below 
indicated a figure for public sector net investment of something under 2 per cent of GDP and 
above we argued that the figure compatible with the 40 per cent debt ratio was of the order of 
2 per cent of GDP. But there is little reason to think that this is the appropriate scale of public 
investment in terms of the needs of the economy for infrastructure and other investments. In 
fiscal policy terms, there is little reason to think that an average budget deficit of this size is 
the right one to achieve high levels of employment. The counter part of a budget deficit is, of 
course, the sum of private net (of investment) savings plus the capital account surplus. It 
would need to be established that the sum of those two terms will turn out to be 2 per cent of 
GDP at a high level of economic activity. 
The fiscal rules of new Labour are significantly less restrictive than those imposed by the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) : an overall 
budget deficit of the order of 2 per cent of GDP compared with the balanced budget or small 
surplus envisaged in the SGP. Further whilst the SGP places an upper limit of 3 per cent of 
GDP on the budget deficit, the fiscal rules of new Labour do not place any upper limit on the 
size of budget deficit during a recession.  
8 
There is an underlying notion of a fairly regular business cycle of the order of 4 to 8 years in 
length. In policy discussions, the identification of the business cycle has been treated as 
unproblematic though (as noted below) in practice its dating has encountered some 
difficulties. The Treasury has adopted the approach of estimating whether the ‘golden rule’ 
has been met by reference to the start of the cycle and calculations relating to the complete 
cycle rather than using some form of moving average covering a complete cycle (centred on 
say the current time). This could have particularly constraining effects on the budget deficit 
towards the end of the cycle striving to meet the ‘golden rule’ in so far as deficits had 
accumulated in the earlier phases of the cycle. It can be seen that the ‘golden rule’ seeks to 
build in the notion of a balanced current budget position over the business cycle, which runs 
counter to the precepts of ‘functional finance’ which ‘rejects completely the traditional 
doctrines of “sound finance” and the principle of trying to balance the budget over a solar 
year or any other arbitrary period’ (Lerner, 1943, p.355). The current budget is to be balanced 
over the cycle, though not on annual basis which permits the operation of the ‘automatic 
stabilisers’. This approach presumes that an average a balanced (current) budget is consistent 
with the achievement of high levels of economic activity and that there is sustained issue of a 
lack of effective demand. 
4. Meeting the ‘golden rule’ 
There has been considerable debate as to whether the government has met the ‘golden rule’. 
In December 2006, the Chancellor claimed on the basis that the business cycle began in 
1997-98 and would be ending in early 2007 that  ‘[t]he projections show that the Government 
is meeting the golden rule, on the basis of cautious assumptions, with an average annual 
surplus on the current budget over this economic cycle of 0.1 per cent of GDP. On this basis, 
and based on cautious assumptions, the Government is meeting the golden rule and there is a 
margin against the golden rule of £8 billion in this cycle’ (Treasury, 2006c, p.218). However 
at around the same time the OECD suggested that ‘[r]ecent fiscal outturns suggest that the 
government may find it difficult to meet its golden rule fiscal objective without additional 
revenue or expenditure measures, although this also depends in large part on the dating of the 
business cycle, which is uncertain.’ (OECD, 2006, p.67) 
Judging whether the ‘golden rule’ has been met has not been straightforward. The precise 
measurement has been one (relatively minor) issue : how should the budget deficits be 
cumulated, e.g. in nominal or real terms and then summed, or in percentage terms. More 
significantly has been the issue of the dating of the business cycle. Institute for Fiscal Studies 
(2007) list the recent changes in the cycle as identified by the Treasury with Treasury (2005) 
9 
identifying the cycle as 1999Q1 to 2006Q1, Treasury (2006a) as 1997Q1 to 2009Q1 and 
Treasury (2006c) as 1997Q1 to 2007 Q1. This feeds into a major criticism that ‘the Code [for 
Fiscal Stability] leaves the government to decide whether or not to set itself any operating 
rules and, if it does, to decide whether those rules have been kept to or not. There is no 
penalty (other than potential reaction of voters and financial market participants) if they are 
missed.
 
This has contributed to suspicions that the government has applied the rules in such a 
way as to make them easier to meet while avoiding having to make painful policy 
adjustments at politically inconvenient times. This in turn has prompted calls for greater 
independence in judging adherence to the rules so that the Treasury no longer ‘marks its own 
exam paper’’ (Institute of Fiscal Studies, 2007, p.33).  
Table 2 near here 
The historic record on budget deficits and debt since 1990 is given in Table 2. It can be seen 
that judged on a cyclically adjusted basis fiscal policy was tight in the first years of ‘new 
Labour’ but with a significantly loosening in the subsequent years. The fiscal policy in those 
early years of ‘new Labour’ was also tighter than under the preceding Conservative 
government. The surpluses on the current budget which accrued in the four years beginning 
1998/9 under the impact of restraints on government expenditure, falling savings and 
booming investment were the major factor in enabling the ‘golden rule’ to be met (or nearly 
met) over the cycle. With that background, the ‘golden rule’ may well have had little 
constraining effect on the operation of fiscal policy in the latter years. However, from the 
present position that may no longer hold in the sense that as a new cycle is set to begin the 
current budget is in deficit (for 2006/07). Table 3 indicates that the current budget is 
projected to return to surplus from 2008/09 onwards, with a tightening of the fiscal stance as 
judged by the cyclically-adjusted surplus. This return to surplus comes from a combination of 
a forecast rise in receipts by government of 0.7 per cent of GDP and a decline in expenditure 
of nearly 1 per cent of GDP by 2011/12 (implying a growth rate in public expenditure in real 
terms of just under 2 per cent per annum).  
Table 3 near here 
The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) has been given a substantial role in stimulating public 
investment. For example, Paul Boateng, then Financial Secretary to the Treasury argued that 
‘it is this sustained improvement in our public finances that makes possible the prospect of 
sustained investment in our public services.  In our latest three-year spending review we 
embarked on a wholesale modernisation of public services. … The Private Finance Initiative 
and Public Private Partnerships are essential tools for delivering this investment.  Since May 
10 
1997, over £16bn and around 400 signed deals. And there are another 300 projects in various 
stages of procurement, worth an estimated £16 billion, which will take us to a total of around 
£30 billion. This is a key contribution to investment in public services and the regeneration of 
our country.’ (Boateng 2001) I have discussed elsewhere (Sawyer, 2003, 2005) the 
desirability or otherwise of the PFI, and specifically pointed to the spurious nature of the 
argument that PFI increases public investment. The implications for the budget deficit and 
public debt are particularly noted. The PFI in effect replaces expenditure financed by debt 
with the consequent future interest payments by expenditure undertaken by private firms for 
which they are repaid by leasing agreements over a period of up to 30 years. At the time at 
which the investment in capital equipment is undertaken by a private firm, there is no public 
expenditure incurred, but rather the future stream of public expenditure is increased (by the 
leasing and management charges). The overall effect of a move from ‘traditional’ public 
sector investment to PFI is to increase public expenditure over the life time of the project 
(essentially because the implicit cost of finance under PFI is higher than the cost under 
‘traditional’ financing through sale of bonds) and to understate the scale of public liabilities. 
The obligation to make future payments (for leasing, maintenance etc.) under PFI is a liability 
of the public sector and as such should be included in the public debt (as it would be in a 
comparable situation in the private sector). “The Government's Private Finance Initiative ... 
attempts to inject expensive private finance into a residual public sector. The merit, in the 
government's eyes, is that this [PFI] reduces, in the short run, its need to raise finance in its 
own name either by taxation or through a higher PSBR. To be precise, the PFI ... will affect 
the time pattern or composition of public expenditure by removing present capital investment 
outlays and subsequently adding the payments needed to furnish the privately owned capital 
with its normal remuneration.” (Fleming and Oppenheimer, 1996, p.62). Treasury (2006b) 
Table B24 reports the outstanding commitments under PFI though to 2031/32 (i.e. a 25 year 
period though many contracts are for 30 years): the outstanding obligation under PFI as of 
March 2006 amounted to £161.4 billion, and applying a real rate of discount of 2 (3) per cent 
the present value would be £131.4 billion (119.6)6. The public sector net debt position at the 
end of 2005/06 was £462.7 billion (and £529.1 billion when calculated on the Maastricht 
Treaty basis of general government gross debt).  
On the other side, the PFI capital expenditure has often been ‘off budget’, and hence that 
expenditure has not been included as part of public expenditure and hence not as part of the 
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 Calculated from Treasury (2006a), Table B25 
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budget deficit. The PFI capital expenditure has fluctuated around the order of 0.3 per cent of 
GDP. The budget deficit would have been recorded as higher if conventional finance had 
been used. But as the current expenditure associated with PFI builds that is adding to public 
expenditure and raising the budget deficit. It is though likely that the use of PFI has over the 
past decade reduced the recorded budget deficits, even if the reverse is likely to be the case in 
the future. 
Table 3 shows that the net debt position is currently around 37½  per cent of GDP and is 
projected to rise toward 38½ per cent over the next few years, against a ceiling of 40 per cent. 
The inclusion of the debt obligations under PFI would raise the public debt position by the 
order of one quarter and put the debt to GDP ratio closer to 50 per cent (and the gross debt 
under the Maastricht Treaty definitions a further 6 per cent higher). The government’s ability 
to limit the debt to GDP ratio below 40 per cent has depended heavily on the accounting rules 
used for PFI.. The debt including PFI ratio would also be getting close to the 60 per cent limit 
under the Maastricht Treaty definitions.  
Fiscal policy has been operated since 1997 in a clear framework with an underlying view that 
fiscal policy should be operated subject to constraints on budget deficits, and specifically the 
current budget position balanced over the cycle. The close-to-achievement of the ‘golden 
rule’ owes much to the surpluses generated in the late 1990s by the investment boom and 
lower savings, to reduction in nominal interest rates lowering interest payments on public 
debt, to use of the PFI and to the re-dating of the cycle. Whether the budget deficit has been 
actually constrained by this framework is probably impossible to say. But it can be argued 
that the budget deficit since 1997 differs little from earlier periods. For the current budget, 
over the period 1974/75 to 1996/97, the deficit had averaged 1.9 per cent of GDP, whereas 
between 1997/98 to 2005/06 it was very close to zero (0.1 per cent).7 The public sector 
borrowing requirement had averaged 3.1 per cent of GDP over the former period and 1 per 
cent over the latter period. However, in real terms (after allowance for the effects of inflation 
on the real value of public debt) over both periods the borrowing requirement was close to 
zero. This is reflected in the net public debt to GDP ratio which fell from 52 per cent in 1974 
to 26 per cent in 1990, to rise back to 41.4 per cent in 1997 and fall to 36.4 per cent in 2005 
(and noting here that this figure is distorted by the treatment of PFI as discussed above).  
5. Good policies or good fortune ? 
                                                
7
 Figures calculated from  Table C25, 1.1. and 2.4 of Treasury (2006a). 
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The discussion in section 2 suggests a relatively good macroeconomic performance since 
1997 with economic growth reasonably stable around 2 ¾ per cent per annum, inflation close 
to its target and unemployment initially declining though broadly flat after 2000. For the near 
ten year period under review, Gordon Brown has been the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and 
our remarks can be seen as a preliminary assessment of his record. For this purpose we will 
accept that macroeconomic performance has been reasonably good, but noting that how good 
the performance has been depends on the criteria applied and the comparisons made8. Here 
we consider whether the ‘good’ economic performance has resulted from the policies pursued 
and/or from good fortune. The government itself has made much of the contribution of new 
macroeconomic framework put in place in the early days of the new Labour government, 
notably the operational independence of the Bank of England and the Code of Fiscal Stability 
and the associated adoption of the ‘golden rule’, as is readily apparent from any Budget 
Statement or Pre-Budget Report (e.g. Treasury (2006a, 2006c).  
One source of good fortune arises from a combination of good inherited economic conditions 
and a generally favourable world economic climate. In terms of inflation that has clearly been 
the case. The inherited economic conditions (cf. Table 1) were generally good and rather 
better than the conditions which previous Labour governments had inherited. Inflation on a 
world-wide basis has also been low.  
A further source comes from policy decisions taken for essentially political reasons which 
turn out to be good decisions from a macro-economic perspective. The new Labour 
government came into office with a commitment to maintain the previous Conservative 
government’s spending plans for the first two years, even though those spending plans were 
very tight9. It is likely that the Conservative government would not have kept to those 
spending plans if they had continued in office10. The Chancellor boasted that ‘Public 
                                                
8
 The significant current account deficit, the continuing decline of manufacturing and the 
absence of any significant reductions in inequality should also be brought into the 
assessment. 
9
 In the words of the manifesto, “Stick to planned public spending allocations for the first 
two years of office. Our decisions have not been taken lightly. They are a recognition of 
Conservative mismanagement of the public finances. For the next two years Labour will 
work within the departmental ceilings for spending already announced. We will resist 
unreasonable demands on the public purse, including any unreasonable public sector pay 
demands.” (Labour Party,  1997, bold in original). 
10
 “In his November[1996] Budget he [Kenneth Clarke] announced minuscule increases in 
spending in the hope that his Labour shadow, Gordon Brown, would lose public credibility 
by refusing to swallow the poisoned pill. Mr Clarke was wrong. Mr Brown not only 
swallowed the pill, he swallowed it with relish. In order to prove his Iron Chancellor 
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borrowing has been reduced by £31 billion over the past two years [i.e. 1997 to 1999]- a 
cumulative fiscal tightening of 3¼ per cent of GDP, the largest fiscal tightening since 1981 - 
and the March Budget continues to lock in that fiscal tightening by keeping the public 
finances under control, while allowing fiscal policy to continue to support monetary policy in 
the next stage of the cycle.’11  
The effects of restraining public expenditure in macroeconomic terms depends on the 
buoyancy or otherwise of private expenditure, and we argue that Brown was fortunate in that 
the tight restraints on public expenditure in the early years came when private expenditure 
was booming. As will be seen from Table 5, strong investment and export demand in 1997 
and 1998 meant that the tight constraints on public expenditure did not lead to an economic 
slowdown. In a similar vein but in the opposite direction, public expenditure, particularly on 
education and health was boosted from 2001 onwards. ‘An expansionary fiscal policy has 
been an important factor supporting demand since the global downturn; between 2000 and 
2004 the cyclically-adjusted balance declined by 4½ per cent of GDP, which was only 
exceeded by the United States. Over the same period over half of new jobs have been created 
in the public sector, which has experienced average employment growth of 2% per annum 
(about six times the growth rate in private sector employment).’ (OECD, 2005, pp. 29-30). 
The idea of fiscal policy as acting as an automatic stabiliser implies that the levels of public 
expenditure on goods and services and structure of tax and transfer payments are held 
relatively stable with respect to the business cycle, and the budget deficit varies counter-
cyclically as tax receipts and transfer payments rise and fall with the cycle. The difficulty of 
judging in practice whether fiscal policy has been used in this way is, of course, that public 
expenditure and tax structure will change for a variety of reasons unconnected with the 
business cycle.  
The final column in Table 4 indicates substantial shifts in ratio of total public expenditure to 
GDP : over the new Labour period initially falling by 3.7 percentage points (1999/2000 over 
1996/97), and then rising by 5.1 percentage points (2005/06 over 1999/2000).  The growth of 
                                                                                                                                                  
credentials, he not only kept to Mr Clarke’s hideously tough plans but managed to cut public 
spending in inflation-adjusted terms during Labour’s first two years…. Mr Clarke, who 
admits that he would have torn up his plans had John Major won in 1997, says that there was 
no economic reason to justify the squeeze on public spending in Labour’s first two years” 
(Elliot, 2001).  
11
 From a speech by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the CBI annual dinner, 18 May 1999 
(available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk./newsroom_and_speeches/press/1999/press_80_99.cfm) 
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public expenditure on goods and services has varied between -0.38 per cent (1997) and 
around 3 ½ per cent (1999, 2002, 2003). Table 3 indicates movements in the cyclically 
adjusted borrowing requirement from -1.5 per cent of GDP in 1999/2000 and 2000/01 to +3.2 
per cent in 2004/05. Fiscal policy was substantially tightened from 1997/98 to 2000/01 (as 
judged by the cyclically adjusted public sector net borrowing) by 2.2 percentage points of 
GDP and significantly loosened through to 2004/05 by 4.7 percentage points. These 
variations do not fit easily with fiscal policy acting solely as an automatic stabiliser, and gives 
the impression of marked shifts in the fiscal stance. The question here is whether these 
variations which are not seen as arising from attempts to fine tune the economy through fiscal 
policy have nevertheless acted in a stabilising manner.  
Tables 4 and 5 near here 
It can first be noted that the variability of GDP is considerable smaller than the variability of 
its various components : measured by the standard deviation of growth rate, GDP was 0.641 
over the period 1997 to 2005, whereas standard deviation for investment  growth was 4.266, 
exports 2.837 and government expenditure on goods and services 1.318. The substantial 
variability of the different components offset one another to lead to a much lower variability 
in GDP. Has public expenditure itself become more stable ? In terms of total public 
expenditure, the standard deviation of annual growth rate of expenditure (in real terms) over 
the period 1971/72 to 2004/05 was 3.02, a period which included growth of around 10 per 
cent in 1973/74 and 1974/75. Omitting those years, over the period 1975/76 to 1996/97 the 
standard deviation was 2.23 whereas over the new Labour years the standard deviation was 
2.45.12  That limited comparison does not suggest that the stability of public expenditure 
growth has risen. The contribution of public expenditure to the relatively stable picture for 
GDP then does not appear to have arisen from a passive stance over public expenditure. It 
may have come from the fortuitous variation of public expenditure in the face of private 
expenditure variations. For example, the correlation between the growth of public 
expenditure and the growth of total private expenditure was -0.57, indicating some offsetting 
variation in public expenditure for variations in private expenditure. 
The fiscal policy rules in the Code for Fiscal Stability appeared to place significant 
constraints on the size of budget deficits. However, in the outturn there does not seem to have 
been an effective constraint on the fiscal deficit as compared with what would be required to 
sustain a high level of employment. The budget deficits in 2004 and 2005 were at levels 
                                                
12
 Calculated from expenditure figures given in Treasury (2006a) Table C26. 
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(relative to GDP) comparable to those of the 1980s and were only low by comparison with 
the figures of the early 1990s. The test for the ‘golden rule’ is likely to come over the next 
few years. Starting from the present position of a budget deficit exceeding 3 per cent of GDP 
with output gap close to zero suggests that over the whole of a cycle with the present fiscal 
stance the budget deficit would average close to 3 per cent, and significantly away from zero. 
Further, any significant slow down in economic activity would lead to substantial increases in 
the budget deficit. A budget deficit position compatible with the ‘golden rule’ would require 
some combination of rise in investment, fall in domestic savings, or improvement in the 
current account.  
There is another way in which fortune has smiled on the Chancellor, namely that the UK has 
not been a member of the Economic and Monetary Union. The actual budget deficits and 
indeed the golden rule implying, as argued above, an average budget deficit of 2 per cent of 
GDP would have breached the terms of the Stability and Growth Pact. It could, of course, be 
argued that since France and Germany similarly ran budget deficits outside of the rules and 
no effective action was taken against them – though they were censured, and a smaller 
country Portugal was forced to cut public expenditure with a consequent rise in 
unemployment. However, at the same time, the UK would have gone through a round of 
embarrassing pressures to lower the budget deficit. Evidence of this is that the UK was 
declared to have an excessive deficit and ‘invited’ to bring the deficit below the 3 per cent of 
GDP level (European Commission, 2006). This despite the UK Treasury insistence that “This 
year we expect to have a treaty deficit of 3%, falling to 2.7% next year, and down to 1.5% by 
2010”, and that “The UK continues to have the lowest average debts and deficits of any other 
major European economy”; also “We make no apologies for investing in vital public 
services” (reported in Gow and Seager, 2006). If the ‘golden rule’ continued to be applied in 
its present form which, as we argued above, implies an average budget deficit of the order of 
2 per cent of GDP, this would be in clear conflict with the Stability and Growth Pact which 
requires balance or small surplus of the budget position over the course of the business cycle. 
6. Conclusions 
The fiscal policy of ‘new Labour’ could be described as stressing “the importance of 
prudence and transparency” (Treasury, 2000, p. 9, and many other documents), with the aim 
of a long-run budget deficit around 2 per cent of GDP and debt to GDP ratio of 40 per cent. 
We have cast doubt on the validity of the ‘golden rule’ as a guiding principle for 
macroeconomic policy. There has been debate as to whether the ‘golden rule’ has been 
achieved, and we have argued that the debt to GDP ratio has only met the 40 per cent rule 
16 
through the accounting practices associated with the private finance initiative. Whilst there 
has been a welcome reduction in unemployment, the fall on the ILO count is far from 
impressive : the unemployment rate in late 2006 represents a fall of one quarter on the rate in 
mid 1997. There has been a relative stability of the UK economy, and notably an avoidance 
of recessions. We have argued that largely by luck fiscal policy has in practice operated in a 
stabilising manner with substantial shifts in the fiscal stance, and that the latitude allowed by 
the ‘golden rule’ has not in practice constrained the ability of the government to run budget 
deficits of an appropriate magnitude. 
17 
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Table 1 : Summary macroeconomic data 
 
 
Growth rate Inflation rate Unemployment 
(claimant count) 
Unemployment (ILO) 
1992 0.28 3.76 9.18  
1993 2.43 1.57 9.80 10.38 
1994 4.41 2.49 8.88 9.50 
1995 2.85 3.41 7.63 8.63 
1996 2.73 2.41 6.95 8.05 
1997 3.16 3.16 5.30 6.95 
1998 3.24 3.42 4.50 6.25 
1999 3.03 1.51 4.13 6.05 
2000 4.03 2.97 3.58 5.45 
2001 2.36 1.78 3.18 5.08 
2002 2.06 1.69 3.08 5.18 
2003 2.66 2.90 2.98 5.03 
2004 3.26 2.98 2.75 4.75 
2005 1.86 2.84 2.75 5.0 
 
Source: Calculated from National Income Blue Book, various issues, Economic Trends 
Annual Supplement and Economic Trends June 2006 
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Table 2  Budget deficits 
All expressed as per cent of GDP 
 Public sector 
current 
budget  
Cyclically adjusted 
surplus on current 
budget 
Public sector 
net borrowing 
Cyclically adjusted 
public sector net 
borrowing 
1989/90 1.5 -1.4 -0.2 2.6 
1990/91 0.3 -1.2 1.0 2.6 
1991/92 -2.0 -1.5 3.8 3.4 
1992/93 -5.7 -3.8 7.6 5.7 
1993/94 -6.4 -4.2 7.8 5.6 
1994/95 -4.8 -3.4 6.3 4.9 
1995/96 -3.4 -2.5 4.7 3.9 
1996/97 -2.8 -2.3 3.5 3.0 
1997/98 -0.1 0.0 0.8 0.7 
1998/99 1.2 1.1 -0.5 -0.3 
1999/2000 2.3 2.0 -1.8 -1.5 
2000/01 2.5 1.9 -2.1 -1.5 
2001/02 1.0 0.9 0.1 0.3 
2002/03 -1.1 -0.7 2.3 1.9 
2003/04 -1.7 -1.3 3.0 2.7 
2004/05 -1.6 -1.6 3.3 3.2 
2005/06 -1.2 -1.0 3.0 2.8 
 
Source : Treasury (2006c), Table  B30
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Table 3: Meeting the fiscal rules 
 
(All figures are per cent of GDP) 
 
 2005-
06  
Outturn 
2006-07  
Estimate 
2007-08 
Pro-
jection 
2008-09 
Pro-
jection 
 
2009-10 
Pro-
jection 
 
2010-11 
Pro-
jection 
 
2011-12 
Pro-
jection 
Golden rule        
Surplus on 
current budget 
-1.2 -0.6 -0.1 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.8 
Average 
surplus since 
1997-1998 
0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Cyclically-
adjusted 
surplus on 
current budget 
-1.0 -0.4 -0.1 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.8 
Sustainable 
investment rule 
 
       
Public sector 
net debt 
36.4 37.5 38.2 38.6 38.7 38.7 38.5 
 
Debt at end March; GDP centred on end March. 
 
Source: Treasury (2006c) Table 1.1 
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Table 4 Trends in public expenditure 
(all expressed as percent of GDP) 
 Public sector 
current expenditure 
Public sector net 
investment 
Public sector 
gross investment 
Total managed 
expenditure 
1989/90 36.0 1.3 4.0 39.7 
1990/91 36.4 1.4 3.9 40.0 
1991/92 38.7 1.8 3.9 42.6 
1992/93 40.5 1.9 3.9 44.5 
1993/94 40.4 1.4 3.4 43.8 
1994/95 39.4 1.4 3.3 43.3 
1995/96 39.4 1.4 3.2 42.6 
1996/97 38.5 0.7 2.3 40.8 
1997/98 37.0 0.6 2.1 39.2 
1998/99 36.0 0.7 2.1 38.1 
1999/2000 35.3 0.5 1.9 37.1 
2000/01 35.8 0.4 1.7 37.5 
2001/02 36.3 1.1 2.4 38.7 
2002/03 37.0 1.2 2.5 39.5 
2003/04 37.8 1.4 2.6 40.4 
2004/05 38.4 1.7 3.0 41.5 
2005/06 39.1 1.8 3.1 42.2 
 
Source : Treasury (2006c), Table B31  
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Table 5  Growth of components of demand 
 
 
Growth of 
consumer 
expenditure 
Growth of 
investment 
expenditure 
Growth of 
public 
expenditure 
on goods and 
services 
Growth 
of 
exports 
Growth of 
final 
expenditure 
Growth of 
private 
expenditure 
1996 3.80 3.04 0.85 8.85 4.33 4.84 
1997 3.48 8.13 -0.38 8.22 4.58 5.27 
1998 3.95 14.30 1.16 2.96 4.66 5.25 
1999 4.51 3.72 3.57 3.75 4.09 4.20 
2000 4.62 1.93 3.05 9.12 4.96 5.25 
2001 2.97 3.17 2.41 2.91 2.91 2.99 
2002 3.45 1.68 3.44 0.97 2.70 2.57 
2003 2.90 1.20 3.49 1.78 2.51 2.36 
2004 3.37 6.21 3.19 4.87 4.01 4.16 
2005 1.42 2.05 2.64 6.47 2.72 2.73 
 
Source: Calculated from National Income Blue Book, Table 1.3 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
